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Abstract 
 
The institutional structure of global commodity chains and cross-border 
production networks has a profound impact on how the benefits of 
globalized production are distributed. This paper engages with this issue 
by developing a model that combines the insights of earlier unequal 
exchange theorists and new work on global commodity chains to clarify 
the distributive dynamics of the expansion of low-wage manufacturing in 
the developing world. In this framework, the ability of productivity-led 
development to raise employment incomes in low-wage manufacturing is 
constrained and depends on how the benefits of productivity improvements 
are captured – as lower prices for consumers or higher rents for brand-
name multinationals. In contrast, consumption-led growth in relatively 
affluent consumer markets will contribute to income convergence when 
demand for manufactured consumer imports is sufficiently income elastic. 
However, in the long-run, labor market, macroeconomic, and 
environmental constraints will likely compromise this form of export-led 
employment growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Relying on consumer markets of affluent countries to provide the demand needed 
for export growth frequently involves new types of dependencies for low-wage 
manufacturing sectors. Large retail conglomerates, brand-name multinationals and 
intermediate buyers have more market power than small, competitive producers and 
subcontractors, affecting their ability to capture the benefits associated with an expansion 
of low-wage manufacturing. The institutional structure of global commodity chains and 
cross-border production networks matters a great deal for determining how the benefits of 
globalized production are distributed among the various players – from low-wage 
subcontractors to multinational corporations. Moreover, the nature of these relationships 
determines the effectiveness of a productivity-led strategy relative to a demand-led 
strategy for narrowing the income gap between high-income and low-income economies. 
 
 The “unequal exchange” tradition offered a trade-based explanation of divergent 
growth when developed countries specialized in industrial manufacturing and developing 
countries specialized in raw materials and primary products. Many of the insights of these 
earlier theoretical arguments can be applied to the structures of modern demand-driven 
commodity chains. However, whether these similarities produce the same outcome of 
trade-based divergent growth is the subject of on-going debate. This paper engages with 
this controversy by providing an alternative theoretical framework that combines the 
insights of earlier unequal exchange theorists and new work on global commodity chains 
in an effort to clarify the distributive dynamics of low-wage manufacturing in the 
developing world. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section provides a backdrop to the 
rest of the article by describing relevant trends in the globalization of production and 
consumption. It relates these issues to the earlier unequal exchange theories of divergent 
growth. In so doing, global commodity chain analysis is connected with the insights of 
the unequal exchange tradition. The third section presents a formal model, with a 
particular focus on branding and similar strategies of monopolistic competition in 
affluent consumer markets, on the one hand, and the intensely competitive conditions 
which subcontractors face, on the other. The model is used to explore how exogenous 
changes in the parameters of the model – e.g. productivity improvements – affect 
distributive outcomes along the commodity chain. The fourth section empirically 
investigates whether demand-driven export growth is likely to contribute to a narrowing 
or widening of income inequalities. The fifth section discusses the implications of this 
analysis for policy and a short summary concludes the paper.   
 
2. Global production, consumer economies, and unequal exchange 
 
The pattern of trade in manufactured goods has undergone a significant 
transformation in recent decades, with the broad composition of exports from less 
developed countries converging to that observed in advanced economies. Manufactured 
goods account for an increasing share of the exports of developing countries. Figure 1 
documents these changes from 1970 to 2000. In the 1970s, manufacturing accounted for 
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less than 20 percent of all exports of developing countries. By 2000, this proportion had 
risen to over 70 percent. Care must be taken in generalizing this trend. Much of the 
change was driven by key economies in East Asia and Latin America. Manufacturing 
remains underdeveloped in many of the poorest countries of the world. Nevertheless, the 
overall transformation is notable – developing countries are producing an increasing 
share of the world’s manufactured exports. 
 
Figure 1 
Manufacturing exports as a percentage of total exports, 
developed and developing countries, 1970-2000. 
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Source: United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey 2002, Table A14-15, pp. 300-3; World 
Economic and Social Survey 2000, Table A15, pp. 263-4; ILO, World Employment Report 1995, 
Table 6, p. 33. 
 
 The growth in manufactured exports contributes to an intensification of trade 
competition. Not only are developing countries competing with the established 
manufacturing sectors of advanced industrial countries, they also are competing with 
each other. Improving a country’s global competitive position has emerged as a 
cornerstone of export-orient growth strategies in which expanding the export sector 
becomes the engine of industrial development. In addition, guaranteeing access to the 
markets of affluent economies has emerged as an obvious corollary to an export-led 
growth strategy.  
 
The large consumer markets of North America, Western Europe, and Japan 
represent a vast source of purchasing power for manufactured exports. For example, U.S. 
imports of goods from non-OPEC developing economies increased from 23.0 percent of 
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total imports of goods in 1978 to 44.6 percent by 2002.1 Over the same period, U.S. 
imports of capital goods, consumer goods, and automotive products as a share of all 
imported non-petroleum goods grew from 56.6 percent in 1978 to 78.8 percent in 2002. 
This mirrors the changing composition of exports from developing countries, away from 
agricultural goods, raw materials, and industrial supplies and towards manufactured 
goods. 
 
 In contrast to externally-focused, export-oriented industrialization, the historical 
expansion of manufacturing capacity in the advanced industrialized states has been linked 
to the development of domestic consumer markets. Studies of the industrial development 
of the U.S. and other Western economies prior to the 1970s have argued that both 
industrial wages and forms of social protection (e.g. income replacements and minimum 
wages) supported the aggregate demand necessary for maintaining profitability and 
investment (see, for example, Boyer and Juillard 2002, Glyn et al. 1990, Piore and Sabel 
1984, Aglietta 1979: 151-208). The term fordism, after Henry Ford, is frequently used to 
describe the concurrent development of mass production and the domestic consumer 
market. Ford not only established productivity-enhancing methods of organizing 
production and labor processes, but also argued that workers should be paid wages high 
enough so that they could purchase the industrial products a country produced (Ford 
1973: 116, 124-5).2 In a classical fordist analysis, the organization of production and 
consumption are mutually reinforcing. Mass production with wage increases proportional 
to productivity improvements supports a mass market which, in turn, sustains profits for 
further capital accumulation without triggering a crisis of underconsumption.3 
 
 For today’s advanced economies, industrial development relied, in part, on the 
close tie between the expansion of production and the growth of domestic consumer 
markets. However, the globalization of manufacturing breaks this link. In most cases, the 
former logic linking mass production and domestic consumption no longer applies – 
wages paid to workers in the export sectors of developing countries do not support 
purchasing power in affluent consumer markets.4 
                                                 
1   Author’s calculations from U.S. international transactions data, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Developing countries include the countries of Latin America, Caribbean, Asia, 
and Africa, excluding Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. 
2    Ford himself raised wages overnight from an average of $2.34 a day to $5.00 a day in 1914.  However, 
a single employer acting alone can not significantly influence aggregate demand. One suggested motivation 
for this historic raise is that it would improve industrial relations and stave off conflictual collective action 
among workers (Raff 1988). Other possible explanations, in the spirit of the efficiency wage tradition, 
include a desire to reduce turnover, an effort to improve the average pool of workers, or an attempt to 
increase effort on the job. 
3    Balancing wage increases with productivity growth can be seen as distinct from a “wage-led growth” 
regime in which higher levels of effective demand, brought about by increases in the share of aggregate 
output going to labor, raises growth rates. Whether higher real wages lead to faster growth depends on 
whether household consumption due to larger labor incomes offsets a potential fall in investment due to 
lower profit rates (Bowles and Boyer 1995).  
4   Some have criticized the fordist analysis for ignoring other crucial factors that helped develop mass 
consumer markets. For example, Medeiros (2000) has emphasized the role that marketing, product 
innovation, and access to credit had in establishing the American pattern of mass consumption as early as 
the 1920s. As globalized production weakens the connection between wages paid at the point of production 
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Despite the breakdown of coordination between domestic production and 
consumption, the importance of the expansion of mass consumer markets in countries 
like the U.S. has not waned with domestic deindustrialization and the growth of global 
manufacturing (Boyer and Julliard 2002). The expansion of consumer-based industries 
provides a source of new, often low-wage, jobs in the relatively affluent economies of the 
global North. It is hard to deny that “Big Retail” plays an increasingly influential role in 
many advanced economies. Perhaps most symbolically, in 2002 Wal-Mart surpassed 
General Motors as the largest U.S. corporation in terms of sales volume.5 More generally, 
according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, manufacturing employment fell 9 
percent from 1980 to 2000 while retail employment increased 55 percent.  
 
This growth in retailing occurred despite pressures on domestic wage incomes. 
Beginning in the 1970s falling real wages in the U.S. and rising unemployment in 
Western Europe raised questions about the ability of wage income to support increasing 
levels of consumption. Nevertheless, the expansion of consumer spending remains an 
important contributor to the growth of these economies. How can a consumer economy 
be sustained in the context of falling real wages or growing unemployment?  
 
The case of the U.S. economy is particularly instructive in this regard. There are 
three important developments which helped industries dependent on American 
consumerism to expand, despite the decline in hourly real wages: (1) more hours of paid 
work, especially among women; (2) the continued expansion of consumer credit 
(including the rapid expansion of credit for purchase of non-durables); and (3) the growth 
in low-cost imports of particular goods which allowed prices to fall and demand to rise. 
 
  Average annual hours of paid work per employee were stable from the end of 
World War II through the 1960s in the U.S., but they began to climb thereafter (Schor 
1992). The trend towards longer hours continues today (Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt 
2001).6 Much of this growth can be accounted for by increases in the hours of paid work 
performed by women. Longer hours help maintain family incomes and consumer 
purchasing power despite lower hourly wages. During this same period, household debt, 
including debt used to purchase consumer goods, was on the rise. Between 1989 and 
1998 average credit card debt increased by 54 percent. By 1998, stocks of debt had risen 
to such a level that average payments on total household debt reached 17.6 percent of 
family income (Kennickell et al. 2000, Kennickell and Starr-McCluer 1994). These 
increases in consumer credit support higher levels of effective demand for goods. 
 
 However, it is the impact of low-wage imports on the relative price of tradable 
goods and the concurrent expansion of consumer economies in advanced industrialized 
                                                                                                                                                 
and the effective demand in affluent consumer markets, these factors identified by Medeiros have become 
increasingly important in extending mass consumption. 
5    See New York Times, April 1, 2002, p. 1. Prior to becoming the largest corporation on the basis of sales, 
Wal-Mart was already the largest single employer in the U.S. 
6    For example, between 1989 and 1998 average annual hours worked increased by 4.3 percent for married 
couple families with children. Hours had already increased by 6.1 percent from 1979 to 1989  (Mishel, 
Bernstein, and Schmitt 2001: 93-108). 
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nations that is of particular relevance to the arguments presented here. Consumers in 
affluent nations benefit from low-wage imports when retail prices fall for the goods they 
purchase. To see this, consider the example of U.S. clothing imports and retail prices. 
Figure 2 illustrates trends in the relative price of clothing since 1958, measured as the 
consumer price index for clothing divided by the consumer price index for other goods, 
excluding the volatile components of food and energy prices.7 Beginning in the early 
1970s, the price of clothing for U.S. consumers relative to a broad index of prices for 
other goods began to fall and it continued to decline throughout the remainder of the 20th 
century. Figure 2 also shows the value of clothing imports as a fraction of domestic 
clothing production over the same period. The growth of clothing imports relative to 
domestic production began to accelerate in the early 1970s, at the same time that relative 
prices began to come down. These empirical trends support the argument that low-cost 
imports contributed to the reduction of retail clothing prices in the U.S.8 
 
Figure 2. 
Import penetration and the relative price of apparel in the U.S., 1958-2000. 
0.0%
50.0%
100.0%
150.0%
200.0%
250.0%
300.0%
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
im
po
rts
 a
s 
a 
%
 o
f d
om
es
tic
 p
ro
d.
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1.10
in
de
x 
of
 re
la
tiv
e 
pr
ic
es
imports/GPO rel. price
 
Source: For the relative price of apparel: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. For imports of apparel: U.S. 
Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, various years. For domestic 
production of apparel (GPO): Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Note: data includes both wearing apparel and footwear. 
                                                 
7    Using the CPI which included food and energy prices does not change the trend illustrated in Figure 2 in 
any meaningful way. 
8    The two time series illustrated in Figure 2 are non-stationary. Cointegration analysis of the two series 
suggests a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between clothing imports relative to domestic 
production and the relative consumer price of clothing. These results are available from the author upon 
request. 
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In 1995, U.S. consumers purchased an average of 28.7 new outerwear garments 
annually; in 1967, the number was just 14.1. Over the same time period, clothing’s share 
of average consumer expenditures dropped from approximately 10 percent to 5.5 percent 
(Abernathy et al. 1999: 4-5). Growth in household incomes could account for this shift. 
However, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, median real household incomes in the 
U.S. rose by just 14 percent and mean real household incomes rose by 34 percent over the 
same time period (U.S. Census Bureau 2000: B-3). These changes in income are 
insufficient to simultaneously account for a doubling of per capita garment purchases and 
a halving of expenditure share. Therefore, falling relative prices must explain a large 
portion of the consumption boom.9 
 
 Trade theory in the Heckscher-Ohlin/Stopler-Samuelson (HOSS) tradition 
provides an explanation of these trends. Developing countries, with an abundance of 
inexpensive labor and a relative scarcity of fixed capital assets, will specialize in low-
wage production while advanced industrialized countries will concentrate on industries 
using capital- and technology-intensive techniques. Under conditions of unrestricted 
trade, the relative prices of goods adjust so that prices of labor-intensive products will fall 
in high-income, high-tech countries.  
 
However, the HOSS tradition does not incorporate an analysis of the institutions 
that structure modern networks of production, distribution, and consumption. Instead, 
HOSS theories focus on seamlessly mapping the movement of relative factor and output 
prices and thereby abstract from the institutional structure of trade networks. The HOSS 
analysis also excludes consideration of the macroeconomic environment and simply 
assumes full-employment. The dynamism of consumer economies in the global North has 
a profound impact on the growth of globalized manufacturing. Given the de-linking of 
production and consumption on a global scale, the invocation of Say’s Law – supply will 
create its own demand – becomes a questionable assumption.  
 
 By pushing aside the institutional structure of international trade networks, the 
HOSS approach concludes that the optimal strategy for developing economies with an 
abundance of low-wage labor is to specialize in the production of low-cost, labor-
intensive exports. However, this type of industrial specialization could push developing 
countries onto a low-wage, low-productivity growth path. Recent experience suggests 
that a low-road strategy is not the only option. Several countries, most notably the newly 
industrializing economies of East Asia, have successfully pursued interventionist trade 
and industrial policies that have allowed them to move up the industrial development 
ladder. These types of interventions confound the logic of the HOSS approach in which 
interventions into the process of specialization and free-trade produce distortions and 
undesirable outcomes. Because of these short-comings, a theoretical approach to 
                                                 
9    Empirical studies of the income elasticity of real clothing expenditures have found that clothing demand 
is inelastic – e.g. one point estimate of the income elasticity is approximately 0.50 while the estimate of the 
long-run price elasticity is -1.0 (Mokhtari 1992). Therefore, given the changes in average income, per 
capita U.S. clothing purchases should have grown by approximately 7 to 17 percent. For real clothing 
purchases to have doubled, falling relative prices must have played a critical. 
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international trade is needed that specifically incorporates an analysis of the institutional 
setting in which global exchanges take place. 
 
 A different approach to international trade – the “unequal exchange” tradition – 
provides an alternative framework for examining the distributive consequences of the 
context in which global exchange occurs. The spirit of this earlier literature is reflected in 
a new theoretical framework that is frequently called “global commodity chain” 
analysis.10 This approach specifically looks at the organization of global networks that 
have arisen with the internationalization of manufacturing. The innovations of global 
commodity chain analysis and the established insights of the unequal exchange tradition 
can be combined to shed light on the distributive implications of the new patterns of 
globalized consumption and low-wage manufacturing.  
 
The term “unequal exchange” was coined by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) in his 
theoretical exposition of the trade relationship that existed between the “core” and the 
“periphery”. In particular, he provides an explanation of the growing inequalities that 
have been observed in the terms of trade between developing countries and the advanced 
industrialized economies. Although using distinct theoretical approaches, earlier works 
by Raúl Prebisch (1950), W. Arthur Lewis (1954), and Hans Singer (1950) formed the 
foundation of a broader unequal exchange tradition, in that they offered different 
structural explanations for observed inequalities in international trade. Emmanuel’s 
evocative name for his approach to the core-periphery trade relationship captures the 
spirit of this rich theoretical tradition.   
 
 These schools of thought directly challenged the economic logic of the original 
conceptualization of an international division of labor in which the industrialized world 
produced manufactured goods while the developing world specialized in primary 
products and raw materials. This arrangement was justified on the grounds of efficiency 
and comparative advantage – a lack of specialization would reduce global income and 
lead to Pareto inferior outcomes. Therefore, developing countries should be content with 
the existing international division of labor since a move towards industrial production 
would jeopardize the efficiency gains of specialization. However, observed patterns in 
the terms of trade during the first half of the 20th century directly contradicted this 
optimistic picture. The unequal exchange tradition explained these empirical trends and 
offered a theoretical alternative. 
 
 The unequal exchange tradition remains relevant today. Many of the 
characteristics of modern international production and trade networks reflect the 
conditions identified by the unequal exchange literature. Three aspects are particularly 
relevant:  
 
                                                 
10    “Global commodity chains,” “global production networks,” “supply chains”, and “filière” all refer to 
similar methods of analysis. For one perspective on the differences between these approaches, see 
Henderson et al. (2002). 
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(1) flexibility in sourcing decisions mimics the effect of capital mobility in the sense 
that competitive pressures limit the scope for subcontractors to raise production 
costs without triggering a substantial loss of output; 
(2) oligopolistic, or monopolistic, structures in advanced economies are explicitly 
linked to competitive conditions in developing country manufacturing; and 
(3) a surplus of labor exists at the point of production such that an expansion in 
output does not bid up wages.  
 
In many respects, these characteristics reflect aspects of the unequal exchange theories of 
Emmanuel, Prebisch, and Lewis, respectively. Not surprisingly, these factors exert a 
strong influence over the distributive outcomes under the new international division of 
labor in a way that is not adequately captured by the HOSS model and other frameworks 
that emphasize the movement of product prices and factor costs alone. In demonstrating 
the relevance of these three approaches to what I am terming the unequal exchange 
tradition – Prebisch-Singer, Lewis, and Emmanuel – it helps to summarize each of their 
key arguments in turn. 
 
 The work of Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer is often taken as representing one 
particular approach in the unequal exchange tradition. The Prebisch-Singer framework 
locates the determinants of the trade-based inequalities between the North and South in 
the differences that exist in the product and factor markets of the developing and 
industrialized countries. The industrialized manufacturing centers were able to translate 
productivity gains into higher incomes in terms of profits or payments to factors of 
production, while producers of primary products lost the benefits of productivity 
improvements to lower prices.  
 
Two factors contributed to this dynamic in the Prebisch-Singer analysis. First, the 
institutions of the industrial North have sufficient market power to cause prices and 
wages to be stickier than is the case in the developing world where greater flexibility 
prevails. Second, the income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods tends to be 
higher than that of primary goods. Therefore, demand for manufactured goods will 
respond vigorously to productivity improvements that raise incomes. However, the 
demand for primary goods responds weakly (or possibly even negatively) to 
technological innovations. Therefore, during periods of productivity-led growth, prices of 
manufactured goods will rise relative to prices of primary products. Since primary 
commodities also tend to be price inelastic, the income terms of trade – that is, receipts 
from exports relative to imports – will also fall, leading to a widening income gap 
between industrialized and developing countries.11 
 
                                                 
11    The notion of “immiserating growth” proposed by Jagdish Bhagwati (1952) shares some analytical 
features with the Prebisch-Singer tradition. In Bhagwati’s model, real economic growth can be associated 
with declining domestic consumption (real per capita income) under certain conditions. This occurs when 
increases in productivity produce a reduction in the terms of trade such that total consumption of imported 
goods actually falls. This is likely to happen when domestic production of imported goods is small and 
demand for imports is price inelastic. 
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 In contrast with the Prebisch-Singer approach to unequal exchange, W. Arthur 
Lewis focused on differences in the structure of the labor markets – in particular, the 
existence of a substantial surplus of labor in the developing world. In his framework, the 
price of labor in a labor surplus economy corresponds to the subsistence wage and labor 
demand can increase substantially without bidding up wages. Capital accumulation raises 
productivity, but in a labor surplus situation wages do not increase. Therefore, unit labor 
costs fall when productivity improves, leading to lower prices or higher profits. In an 
open economy framework, productivity improvements in the export sector of a labor 
surplus economy do not raise wages and incomes. Instead, the gains from productivity 
are lost in the form of deteriorating terms of trade. The benefits accrue to industrial 
purchasers and, potentially, the consumers in industrialized countries. 
 
 Emmanuel uses a markedly different approach to the problem of unequal 
exchange. In essence, Emmanuel applies the transformation problem of Marx to the 
realm of international trade. Profit rates are equalized across national boundaries due to 
the mobility of capital. In contrast, labor is mobile nationally, but immobile 
internationally. National wage levels are taken as independent, exogenous variables, 
determined by a range of historical and institutional factors. Under conditions of 
complete specialization, the free circulation of capital produces a situation in which 
developing countries with low wages suffer a disadvantage in international trade since 
they export goods produced with a given quantity of labor in exchange for imports from 
more industrialized countries produced with relatively less labor. This occurs because the 
price of the imports they purchase must cover both the relatively high wage of the 
industrialized workers and the equalized profit rate. 
 
 Despite theoretical differences, the unequal exchange tradition provides a 
collection of valuable insights into the problem of deteriorating terms of trade in 
developing countries. However, these models address an international division of labor in 
which manufactured goods are exported from the industrial North while developing 
countries specialize in primary products. It is unclear whether the unequal exchange 
tradition applies to the new international division of labor, in which developing countries 
are becoming prominent exporters of manufactured goods.  
 
 Recent research has produced evidence suggesting that developing countries have 
experienced deterioration in the commodity, or net-barter, terms of trade (i.e. the price of 
exports relative to the price of imports) of their manufacturing export sectors vis-à-vis the 
manufacturing sectors of the advanced industrial economies (UNCTAD 2002, Maizels 
2000, Sarkar and Singer 1991). Others have found little evidence of a negative trend in 
the commodity terms of trade for manufactured exports, frequently describing the 
observed pattern over time as trendless (Athukorala 2000, 1993). However, the 
commodity terms of trade do not take into account the fact that manufactured exports 
from developing countries have expanded rapidly in recent years. Declining or trendless 
commodity terms of trade are consistent with rising income terms of trade which 
incorporate changes in the volume of exports (Athukorala 1993).   
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Shifts in the international division of labor raises the question of whether 
comparing the terms of trade between identical manufacturing sectors is the relevant 
comparison. For example, a measure of the terms of trade between manufacturing in 
developing countries and an index of traded services and complex manufacturing in 
advanced economies found that the commodity terms of trade of developing economies 
had deteriorated since 1960 (Minford, Riley, and Nowell 1997). Similarly, the barter 
terms of trade of manufactured goods from developing countries relative to exported 
machinery, transport equipment, and services from developed economies has been 
declining from 1975-95 (Wood 1997). 
 
 In addition to empirical research on manufacturing terms of trade, growing 
attention has been paid to the global institutional connections that shape patterns of 
international industrial production, distribution, and consumption. A prime example is 
global commodity chain analysis which has been put forward by Gary Gereffi and others 
as a means of understanding the organization and relative influence of different players in 
global production systems (Gereffi 1994, 1999; Kaplinsky 2000; Henderson et al. 2003). 
Global commodity chain analysis attempts to explain how the transnational organization 
of production operates and evolves. Instead of focusing only on the movement of the 
relative prices of imports and exports, it also incorporates issues of structural differences, 
dependency, and the nature of retail and consumer markets. For example, in a buyer-
driven commodity chain, large retailers or brand-name corporations set up a decentralized 
system of production and distribution.12 Actual production is subcontracted out to small 
producers who face extremely competitive conditions (Carr, Chen, and Tate 2000, 
Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000, Gereffi 1994). Retailers and brand-name multinationals 
enjoy some degree of market power which they can use to keep prices low for the goods 
they purchase or to earn rents through the development of monopolistic brand identities. 
 
 By combining the specific insights of global commodity chain analysis with the 
theoretical innovations of the unequal exchange traditions, a model of these relationships 
can be developed that explores the distributive consequences of the expansion of 
globalized manufacturing tied to affluent consumer markets through the institutional 
linkages of global commodity chains. Such a model can then be used to analyze the 
implications for manufacturing workers of changes such as productivity enhancements in 
low-wage export sectors, the expansion of consumerism in the affluent markets of the 
global North, or specific policy interventions to move towards sustained egalitarian 
growth. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12    Buyer-driven commodity chains can be contrasted with producer-driven commodity chains in which 
large manufacturing enterprises set up a system of global production. The relatively capital-intensive 
manufacture of automobiles, aircraft, and electrical machinery can be thought of as examples of producer-
driven commodity chains. The literature on fragmentation, which explores the expansion of trade in 
intermediate goods as one aspect of globalized production, also best describes global production networks 
that are established between manufacturing firms (see, for example, Jones 2000 or the collection edited by 
Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001). 
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3. Commodity chains, branding, and distribution: a model 
 
 One of the key features of global commodity chain analysis is the differences in 
market power that are evident as we move along the chain. Subcontractors and direct 
producers face highly competitive conditions while brand-name multinationals and large 
retailers enjoy a much higher degree of monopolistic influence. Unlike earlier discussions 
of unequal exchange and declining terms of trade which attributed differences in market 
structure to differences in the products themselves (e.g. primary commodities versus 
manufactured or finished goods), in a modern commodity chain changes the nature of the 
product itself cannot directly explain different degrees of market power. The sneaker 
purchased in a U.S. suburb is, at least physically, the same sneaker that was shipped from 
Indonesia. However, modern retailing exhibits economies of scale in influencing 
consumer psychology and in the consolidation of extensive supply networks.  Therefore, 
the relative market power enjoyed by retailers and brand-name producers is derived from 
two sources: (1) branding and similar forms of monopolistic competition that shape 
consumer preferences and (2) competitive sourcing. 
 
Retailers and multinational producers earn rents in global commodity chains by 
differentiating their products and pursuing strategies to limit the availability of close 
substitutes.  The model developed below will focus on one common strategy of 
monopolistic competition in affluent consumer markets – branding. For the purposes of 
this discussion, I define branding to be the general process of product differentiation and 
identity-building that gives retailers and brand-name producers a higher degree of market 
power than would otherwise be the case. The benefits of branding can be substantial, 
especially when firms are selling relatively generic products – a pair of shoes, underwear, 
a t-shirt or a cup of coffee. By creating the space to charge higher prices, firms realize 
substantial rents that would be impossible to sustain in a perfectly competitive 
environment for generic products. However, competitive conditions prevail among 
subcontractors who are unable to pursue similar monopolistic strategies since they lack 
direct retail capacity and access to consumer markets. The products themselves are not 
the source of market power, the brand is.13  
 
The relative market power of retailers and brand-name multinationals is also 
derived from their position as single, large buyers. Firms that have consolidated their 
supply and distribution networks on a national scale have a greater degree of leverage in 
enforcing a purely competitive environment at the level of actual production. Large 
retailers can credibly threaten to drop a particular supplier and source from another 
subcontractor elsewhere in the world – thereby insuring that they enjoy competitive 
prices. In this respect, consolidation of distribution and buying channels has been a key 
dynamic behind the competitive strategies and rapid growth of corporate discount 
retailers such as Wal-Mart and Target. 
 
                                                 
13    For an analysis of modern patterns of branding, see Klein (2002). Klein describes the extent of 
branding and it’s tendency to expand into previously uncharted areas: celebrity endorsements, public 
spaces, sponsorships of concerts, art exhibits, and sporting events, and the U.S. education system, from 
elementary schools up to research universities.   
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The highly competitive environment among subcontractors implies that 
competition among producers in developing countries effectively becomes competition 
among unit labor costs (UNCTAD 2002, Rodrik 1997). Therefore, the model developed 
here assumes that producers cannot raise unit production costs without drastically 
reducing output. These competitive conditions exist alongside labor markets which are 
characterized by surplus labor and substantial queuing for new employment 
opportunities. Under such conditions, incomes among low-skill workers in export 
production will not differ substantially from that which could be earned in other types of 
equivalent paid employment.14   
 
 We can develop a model of a global commodity chain that captures these 
characteristics of modern retailing and brand-name multinational production. To start, we 
can disaggregate the retail price, P, of a particular product into shares received by each of 
the prime players in the core commodity chain: (1) the retailers or brand-name 
corporations, (2) the intermediaries (sometimes called “jobbers”) which coordinate 
subcontracted production on behalf of the retailers and brands, and (3) the subcontractors 
who actually produce the goods. Due to the competitive conditions facing subcontractors 
and the existence of surplus labor, unit labor costs are assumed to be equalized across 
producers. We can break down the price components as follows: 
 
(1) P  = ))(1()(
t
wzerPb +++α           
 
in which α represents the gross per unit monopoly rents due to branding (assumed to be 
increasing a decreasing rate), b represents the extent of branding activities (advertising, 
endorsements, promotions, sponsorships, media strategies), r is the percentage of the 
retail price going to intermediaries, e is the exchange rate (with local currency units in the 
denominator), z is the exogenously given competitive profit margin for subcontracted 
producers, w is the average wage per worker,15 and t represents labor productivity (output 
per employee). This expression represents a version of variable mark-up pricing at the 
retail level in which a firm’s ability to bid up prices depends on its investment in 
branding activities.16 
 
 
 
                                                 
14      Empirical evidence supports this theoretical assumption. For example, a survey of labor market 
outcomes among women working in maquiladoras in Tijuana found that the addition of these new jobs did 
not lead to an improvement in the wage incomes of these workers relative to what they could have earned 
in informal work arrangements, although the volatility of income flows was reduced (Fussell 2000). 
15    For informal and home-based production, employment may not be structured as a wage relationship. If 
these workers are paid their unit labor cost, then their wage equivalent could be calculated as the piece-rate 
multiplied by labor productivity. This wage equivalent could be substituted in the above expression 
wherever w appears. 
16    In this respect, the model differs from monopolistic competition models in the Robinson-Hicks 
tradition in which price is determined by the firm’s optimization decisions given a particular degree of 
market power. In this model, the firm effectively chooses a degree of market power, thereby determining 
per unit rents, by its level of investment in branding.  
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 Solving Equation 1 for P gives us the following expression for the retail price: 
 
(2) P  = )])(1()([
)1(
1
t
wzeb
r
++− α  
 
Some immediate accounting relationships can be derived from this expression. For 
example, higher monopoly rents due to branding activities will bid up the retail prices. 
Likewise, if intermediaries (r), subcontractors (z), or production workers (w) are able to 
increase their claims on income within the commodity chain, ceteris paribus, retail prices 
will increase. However, an increase in labor productivity (t) will lower retail prices. This 
raises the possibility that productivity improvements at the level of production will not be 
captured by the workers or the subcontractors themselves – the benefits will be passed up 
the commodity chain. I will return to this point later. 
 
 Since market power is concentrated at the level of the retailer or brand-name 
producer, it makes sense to model the decision-making process of these firms and trace 
the consequences through the commodity chain. The firms are assumed to choose the 
extent of branding (b) to maximize the total value of net rents they can capture in the 
retail market: 
 
  (3) )(),(),()(max bYPcYPb
b
µδδα −−  
  
in which δ(P,Y) represents the demand for the branded commodity as a function of price 
and income, Y represents disposable income, c is the constant per unit cost of retailing, 
and µ is the cost of branding, assuming increasing marginal costs. Two factors contribute 
to the total rents the firm enjoys – the rents they receive for the branded commodity and 
the level of consumer expenditures, which are dependent on prices and incomes.  
 
Note that the level of branding is not included in the consumer demand function, 
although a case could be made that branding also influences the quantity demanded. 
However, including branding in the demand function does not change the fundamental 
logic of the model in any meaningful way, particularly in terms of the issues I focus on 
here. Therefore, for simplicity of exposition, demand in affluent markets is assumed to 
depend on only income and price. 
 
 The first-order condition for maximization is: 
 
  (4) b
b
Pb r
cYP µαδαδα −−−+ )1()(),(  = 0 
 
We can divide this expression into two parts that have a more intuitive interpretation. The 
first part represents the net marginal benefits of branding: 
 
  (5a) B′  =  bb YP µδα −),(  
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This expression indicates the value of the rents that would be enjoyed by increasing the 
extent of branding less the costs of doing so. For example, by investing more into name 
recognition, brand presence, endorsements, and image enhancement, firms will be able to 
raise the price of their products while maintaining a competitive position. 
 
 The second part of Equation 4 represents the indirect marginal costs of branding: 
 
  (5b) C ′= )
1
()(
r
c bP −−−
αδα  
 
While branding raises rents, it also raises retail prices (from Equation 2) and reduces 
demand. A decline in consumer expenditures will reduce total rents, even though rents 
per unit sold could be increasing. This dynamic places constraints on the extent to which 
firms can raise prices and capture additional rents. At some point consumers will stop 
buying. The above expression for the indirect marginal costs of branding captures this 
effect, adjusted for changes in the actual costs of retailing. When net marginal benefits 
equal the indirect marginal costs, the firm is practicing its optimal branding strategy (as 
expressed in Equation 4). 
 
 We can illustrate these relationships graphically. Figure 3 shows the net marginal 
benefit curve (B′) and the indirect marginal cost curve (C′) as a function of the amount of 
branding a firm undertakes. For interested readers, the derivation of slope is included in 
Appendix A. The intersection of these two curves represents the optimal strategy for the 
firm (b* in the graph). 
 
Figure 3 
Marginal benefits, marginal costs, and optimal level of branding. 
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 How would the company’s strategy respond to an exogenous shift in one of the 
distributive parameters of the model? For example, what would happen if a country 
suddenly became more attractive due to the availability of lower cost labor raising from 
an exogenous change in trade policy, greater domestic political stability, an exchange rate 
depreciation, or a general expansion of the global sourcing network? The four-quadrant 
diagram in Figure 4 illustrates the various effects. From Equation 2 we know that, at a 
give level of branding, retail prices will be reduced while per unit rents, as given by the 
function α(b), remain the same. Since prices are reduced at each level of branding, 
demand will increase, thereby causing the marginal benefit curve to shift to the right, 
from B′ to B″, as illustrated in the upper-right frame of Figure 4. The equilibrium level of 
branding moves from b′ to b″. Access to more inexpensive sources of productive labor 
actual leads to an increase in the extent of branding in the more affluent consumer 
markets. 
 
Figure 4. 
Impact of an exogenous change in subcontracted labor costs on 
branding, demand, and prices. 
 
 
 Why is this the case? Branding provides firms with monopoly rents and boosts 
their profitability. However, the extent of branding is constrained by the negative impact 
of higher prices on consumer demand. An exogenous change that makes cheaper sources 
δ(P,Y) 
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of labor available will reduce retail prices for any given level of branding. After such a 
shift, the firm is no longer maximizing total rents at the original level of branding. 
Therefore, the retailer or brand-name producer can raise rents by extending their efforts at 
product differentiation and identity-building further. Before the reduction in labor costs, 
these higher levels of branding would have lowered total rents, since consumers would 
have reacted negatively to the price increases by reducing their demand. 
 
This connection between globalized production and branding strategies is 
reflected in the actual strategic choices of multinational firms. For example, in 1999, the 
president of Levi-Strauss, John Ermatinger, justified the company’s decision to switch to 
lower-cost subcontractors to produce the corporation’s jeans in the following terms: 
 
“Our strategic plan in North America is to focus intensely on brand 
management, marketing, and product design as a means to meet the casual 
clothing wants and needs of consumers. Shifting a significant portion of 
our manufacturing from the U.S. and Canadian markets to contractors 
throughout the world will give the company greater flexibility to allocate 
resources and capital to its brands.” (Quoted in Klein 2002: 195) 
 
 The remaining parts of Figure 4 illustrate what happens to prices and demand 
when average labor costs decline. The lower right quadrant of Figure 4 shows the impact 
on prices. Since production costs are lower, the price curve shifts towards the horizontal 
axis. At a given level of branding, prices fall. However, this tendency for prices to fall is 
partially offset by the higher levels of branding. In Figure 4, the net effect is a reduction 
in prices which leads to an increase in demand, as seen in the lower left quadrant. Total 
rents increase due to a combination of higher per unit rents and increased demand.  
 
  The cost savings from access to lower-cost producers will not always be used to 
expand the branding of a company’s products. Reducing consumer prices to boost overall 
demand is an alternative strategy. Higher levels of demand will raise total rents, even if 
the per unit benefits of branding remain unchanged. Whether a firm chooses to reduce 
retail prices or to expand its branding efforts depends on the elasticity of demand for the 
products it is selling. As final consumption demand for a product becomes more elastic, 
the indirect marginal costs of branding will rise more rapidly, and firms will be more 
likely to lower retail prices than increase branding. For example, discount retailers (e.g. 
Wal-Mart or Kmart), which sell brand-name products for which close substitutes are 
often available, will tend to increase their total rents by focusing on expanding their sales 
volume and keeping prices low. However, specialty retailers (e.g. The Gap, Nike, or 
Disney), which invest more in creating brand identities that limit the perceived 
substitutability of their products, are more likely to focus on developing their brands 
without lowering prices. 
 
 Changes in any of the parameters governing the distribution of value across the 
commodity chain will affect branding decisions and competitive strategies. The relevant 
comparative static calculations are contained in Appendix A. Table 1 summarizes these 
results for total rents and the branding variable. Note the impact on retail prices is more 
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complex. In general, any exogenous change that lowers production costs or reduces the 
share of intermediaries will lower retail prices. However, this need not be the case. Under 
certain circumstances – the existence of an inelastic demand curve and high marginal 
rents due to branding – lower production costs can actually lead to higher retail prices in 
this model. This occurs when the increase in per unit rents associated with a higher level 
of branding more then off-set the effect of lower production costs. 
 
Table 1 
Comparative statics of commodity chain model 
 Branding 
(b) 
Total rents 
δ(P,Y)α(b) 
w- real production wages - - 
t- labor productivity + + 
e- exchange rate (e.g. $US/local) - - 
r – intermediary share - - 
 
 Although the focus here has been on branding and globalized manufacturing, the 
model can be easily generalized to other forms of monopolistic rent-seeking. For 
example, many agricultural and horticultural products – e.g. coffee production – are tied 
into commodity chains which could be analyzed using the same general model. Likewise, 
the commodity chain involving computer products could be modeled using a similar 
technique. Relatively generic electronic component parts are assembled in globalized 
networks while the rents associated with software development tend to accrue in 
advanced economies. Branding plays some role in software markets, but the existence of 
network externalities (i.e. the value of a particular software program depends on how 
many other people are using it) and more traditional monopolistic behavior also 
characterizes the industry. 
 
How does this analysis fit into the earlier literature on unequal exchange and 
global inequalities? If subcontractors and production workers face highly competitive 
conditions, in the long-run they will be unable to capture the direct benefits of 
technological improvements or productivity enhancements in terms of higher standards of 
living, either in terms of increased profits or higher wages. The distribution of 
productivity gains will depend on the optimal competitive behavior of the large 
multinationals that possess some degree of monopoly power. Depending on the nature of 
the specific consumer market, the gains from low-cost production will be distributed 
between affluent consumers on the one hand and brand-name multinationals on the other. 
Bhattacharya and Rahman (1999) provide some empirical evidence supporting this 
argument. Their study of the export-oriented, female-dominated garment industry in 
Bangladesh shows that wages have not kept up with productivity increases. Instead, 
production costs have fallen, suggesting that some of the gains from productivity 
improvements are captured elsewhere along the commodity chain. 
  
 Innovative producers might be able to capture some short-run gains by raising 
productivity, cutting prices, and thereby increasing demand for their output. However, 
competitive pressures among other subcontractors to reduce their unit labor costs will 
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erode these gains over time. Long-run incentives might be inadequate for a subcontractor 
to invest in productivity improvements. If the short-term benefits are not sufficient to 
cover the costs of investing in productivity improvements prior to the dynamic 
adjustment to a new low-cost equilibrium, these improvements will not be made. Under 
these conditions, export production tied to a global commodity chain would be 
characterized by a low-wage/low-productivity trap.17 Of course, when a new competitor 
with lower production costs enters the market, other producers have a clear incentive to 
improve productivity. However, the gains are realized in terms of retaining jobs and 
output, not in terms of higher average living standards per worker.  
 
 Despite the inability of subcontracted labor to capture the direct long-run benefits 
of productivity improvements in this model, the impact of the growth of export 
manufacturing in developing countries on the inequalities that exist between rich and 
poor nations is not obvious. The income generated by new jobs must be taken into 
account. Low-wage, export-oriented manufacturers can raise aggregate incomes in 
developing nations when growth in consumption expenditures generates additional 
employment opportunities in low-wage manufacturing.  Higher levels of employment 
raise the total income of wage earners and could potentially narrow the gap between rich 
and poor. However, there is no guarantee that growing consumerism in wealthy nations 
will produce large numbers of good jobs in the developing world. It is to this issue that I 
now turn. 
 
4. Consumer demand, employment, and wages 
 
 Can growth in real demand in the consumer markets of high-income nations 
generate a large number of new employment opportunities in the developing world and 
will such job creation help reduce global inequalities? Given the possibility that 
productivity-led expansions in the export sectors of developing countries might be 
constrained in their ability to raise employment incomes, this is a particularly relevant 
question for understanding the role that demand-led employment creation could play as 
part of a broader development strategy.  
 
Some economists, such as Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Krugman, have argued that, 
even at poverty wages, sweatshops and low-wage workplaces are a move towards more 
egalitarian outcomes (Krugman 1998, Myerson 1997). Their logic is straight-forward: 
new manufacturing jobs offer a higher income for workers in developing countries than 
do alternative economic activities. This emphasis on employment must be taken 
seriously. The International Labor Organization estimates that at the end of 2002, 
approximately 180 million people will be unemployed around the world (ILO 2003). 
Even China, a champion of low-wage production for the global market, is facing a 
burgeoning problem of unemployment (Xuejin 2000). However, the argument that the 
proliferation of extremely low-wage, export-oriented jobs is an egalitarian force in the 
                                                 
17    Preliminary empirical estimates by Seguino (2003) suggest that higher levels of capital mobility reduce 
productivity growth. Although Seguino focuses on foreign direct investment and capital mobility instead of 
commodity chains and subcontracting, her work provides some evidence that supports the idea of a low-
wage/low-productivity trap along the lines described here. 
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global economy is not a foregone conclusion. Whether the consumption gap between rich 
and poor countries can be narrowed depends, in part, on the responsiveness of 
employment creation to growth in output and global demand. 
 
 In order to keep the arguments clear, I will limit this initial discussion to a simple 
context in which low-wage export manufacturers in the developing world produce goods 
exclusively for consumption in the relatively affluent markets of the global North. 
Therefore, the primary comparison will be between the income/consumption of 
manufacturing workers in the global South and consumers in the global North. Extending 
the analysis of branding and commodity chains developed in the previous section, the 
focus is on the relationship between the export-oriented manufacturing sectors of 
developing countries, taken together, and consumption abroad. In particular, expansion of 
output in the export sectors is assumed to be led by consumer demand in high-income 
markets. In this respect, the scenario is that of a demand-driven commodity chain.  
  
 For the time being, I will restrict my analysis to the impact of changes in 
consumer demand in high-income countries on the total wage income received by 
workers who participate in the labor market for export-sector manufacturing.  This 
includes currently employed workers, both formal and informal, unemployed individuals, 
and people working in subsistence activities who would accept a manufacturing job if 
one were to become available.  
 
 Given these assumptions, what would be the impact of an exogenous increase in 
consumer demand from high-income countries on the total wage income of export 
workers? Labor demand is derived from demand for imports and is a function of real 
wages. This is simply a reformulation of the unit labor cost term in the model developed 
in the previous section.18 Therefore, total real wage income, I, is given by 
 
(6) I  = )),(,( YPwNw rr δ   
 
in which wr is the real manufacturing wage per employee, N is total employment in the 
sector, and δ represents demand for imported consumer goods as a function of price and 
income in the affluent consumer markets.  
 
Expressed as percent changes, the impact of changes in wages and demand for 
exports on employment income is: 
 
(7) 
I
dI  =  )()1(
Y
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r
r χρεη +++  
 
 
                                                 
18    Total employment in the export sector is simply demand for output divided by labor productivity. If 
labor productivity is a function of technological changes and workplace organization influenced by 
exogenously given factor prices – in this case, the real wage rate – then we can write labor demand as a 
function of output demand and wages.   
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where: 
η represents the wage elasticity of employment; 
ε represents the elasticity of employment with respect to output/demand; 
ρ represents the price elasticity of import demand; 
and χ represents the income elasticity of import demand. 
 
 
If we limit our attention to price changes associated with wage fluctuations at the point of 
production, Equation (7) could be expressed as: 
 
(8) 
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 However, in a labor-surplus economy, the number of workers willing to accept a 
job greatly exceeds the number of available employment opportunities. In a competitive 
market with a surplus of labor, we can assume that the growth in jobs would not bid up 
wages. Under such conditions, we can greatly simplify the above relationship: 
 
(9) 
I
dI  =  
Y
dYχε  
 
That is, changes in wage income in the export sector depends on income growth in the 
consumer markets, the elasticity of employment with respect to output, and the income 
elasticity of import demand. This simplifying assumption of constant, competitive wages 
will be relaxed later. 
 
 As described earlier, the income elasticity of demand for goods exported from 
developing countries and imported by more advanced economies is an important variable 
in the unequal exchange tradition, particularly in the work of Prebisch and Singer. The 
demand for raw materials and primary products was assumed to be income and price 
inelastic. However, the same argument might not apply to manufacturing exports from 
developing countries. Growth in the consumer economies of the global North could result 
in even faster growth of wage income in export sectors of the global South if import 
demand turns out to be income elastic. Under such conditions, the expansion of buyer-
driven commodity chains associated with the new international division of labor would 
contribute to greater income equality between low-wage export workers and high-income 
consumers, all other factors being equal. 
 
 Estimates of the income elasticity of import demand in the U.S. and other 
industrialized countries generally lie between 1.0 and 3.0 (Deyak, Sawyer, and Sprinkle 
1997, Senhadji 1997, Goldstein and Khan 1985). That is, import demand appears to be 
elastic. However, these estimates might not apply to import demand for manufactured 
consumer goods that typically are produced and exchanged along demand-driven 
commodity chains.  
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To gauge the magnitude of the income elasticity of demand for these imports, I 
estimated a set of relationships for the United States in which demand is a function of the 
relative price of imports and real personal disposable income. Data on imports of real 
manufactured consumer goods, excluding automobiles, were taken from the U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis. Import prices for non-automobile consumer goods came from the 
price indices of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Relative import prices were calculated as 
a ratio of the import price index and the consumer price index (CPI) for non-food, non-
energy consumer goods. Finally, real income is measured as personal disposable income, 
deflated by the consumer price index. The time series is quarterly and runs from 1982:2 
to 2002:1. 
Details of the estimation procedure are contained in Appendix B. Estimates of 
both the short-run and the long-run price and income elasticities were generated and are 
summarized in Table 2 below. The long-run income elasticity of import demand for 
manufactured consumer goods in the U.S. is estimated to be 2.64 – that is, import 
demand is income elastic and its magnitude is in line with similar estimates of income 
elasticities. When import demand is highly responsive to positive changes in income, the 
long-run expansion of consumer economies, like that of the United States, results in a 
proportionately more rapid growth of demand for consumer imports. This implies that 
total wage income of export producers in demand-driven commodity chains would 
increase at a faster rate than incomes in the more affluent consumer markets (see 
Equation 9). This is a notable difference with the earlier work in the unequal exchange 
tradition which focused on developing countries specialized in producing raw materials 
and primary commodities. However, it is consistent with the empirical studies reviewed 
earlier that describe declining or trendless commodity terms of trade and raising income 
terms of trade. 
Table 2 
Import demand elasticities – summary of estimates 
 Short-run Long-run 
Price -0.61 -2.92 
Income 0.63 2.64 
Source: See Appendix B for details. 
 
 What do these results imply in terms of the question of divergent growth? When 
total wage income of export producers increases at a faster rate than incomes in affluent 
consumer markets, we would expect relative income inequality between these groups to 
decline, as measured, for example, by the ratio of consumer income to the employment 
income in low-wage manufacturing.19 This implies that increased manufacturing 
production in low-wage export sectors would contribute to convergent growth or, at least, 
reduce the rate of divergence. This effect will be larger if exports constitute a large share 
of total production or if there are strong multiplier effects associated with an expansion of 
net exports. If exports are relatively unimportant or multiplier effects are small, the 
                                                 
19    This argument holds for income per capita if the relevant population growth rates are identical. 
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contribution to convergence would be reduced. In addition, absolute differences in 
income could widen, at least initially, even if relative inequality falls. 
 
 The income elasticity of demand is not the only factor influencing the 
responsiveness of employment income to demand growth. There is another variable in 
Equation 9 that must be considered – the elasticity of employment with respect to output. 
The magnitude of this variable will be related to how technological changes and 
workplace organization affect labor productivity. If labor productivity were held constant, 
we would expect the employment elasticity of output to be equal to one. That is, a 
doubling of output would require a doubling of the labor input. However, if labor 
productivity increases with an expansion of output, due to better technologies, more 
capital investment, higher rates of capacity utilization, or changes in production 
processes, then an increase in output would require a proportionately smaller increase in 
labor.20 
 
Take the example of a highly globalized, labor-intensive sector: the international 
apparel industry. Using data from the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) and the World Bank, the long-run elasticity of employment with 
respect to output were estimated using a panel data set covering 49 countries from 1981 
to 1996. Details of these estimations are contained in Appendix C of this paper. The long-
run elasticity was estimated to be 0.86 – that is, a 10 percent increase in output is 
associated with an 8.6 percent increase in employment. Although close to one, this result 
suggests that labor productivity tends to increase as output expands, reducing the job-
creation potential of demand growth in consumer markets. For products other than 
clothing, for which the adoption of labor-saving technology might be easier, this 
elasticity would be expected to be lower. 
 
 This relationship between labor productivity and employment implies a particular 
dynamic for wage incomes of export workers in a global commodity chain. 
Technological changes that raise labor productivity could actually reduce wage incomes 
in developing countries if growth in employment opportunities were curtailed as a result. 
As pointed out earlier, competitive pressures at the point of production limit the extent to 
which such gains could be retained as higher wage incomes or larger profit shares in the 
export industries themselves. However, there is a countervailing trend. If productivity 
improvements lower consumer prices, demand for exports would expand and more 
employment would be created at the prevailing wage. Whether productivity 
improvements raise employment incomes depends on whether the effect of lower prices 
can off-set the labor-displacing effect of higher productivity.  
 
The estimates presented earlier suggest that demand for manufactured consumer 
imports is price elastic. Therefore, the demand effects will outweigh the displacement 
effects if changes in prices are proportionate to changes in unit labor costs.21 However, if 
                                                 
20    Growth in employment opportunities often falls below output growth. See, for example, UNDP(1996) 
and Streeten (1994). 
21    That is, a 10 percent increase in productivity should result in a 10 percent decrease in employment and 
unit labor costs if output and wages are held constant. However, if prices decline proportionately to unit 
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a significant portion of the productivity improvements are captured as higher rents, not 
lower prices, elsewhere along the commodity chain, then the effect on total employment 
income will be negative. 
 
 Along similar lines, suppose we relax the initial, simplifying assumption that 
highly competitive conditions in labor surplus economies prevent real wages from 
increasing as output expands. Instead, wages are allowed to rise modestly with an 
expansion in output and employment. Under these more forgiving conditions, would 
higher average wages help boost the expansion of the employment income of 
manufacturing workers in developing countries? The answer is not obvious and again 
depends on how responsive labor and import demand are to wage increases. If both 
import and labor demand are sensitive to changes in labor costs, then higher wages will 
reduce employment and lower the total income workers receive. Returning to Equation 8, 
the impact of a wage increase on total income from employment can be separated into 
two effects: (1) a labor demand effect at the level of production and (2) a price effect at 
the level of consumption. The relative size of these distinct influences on employment 
income will determine whether higher wages will help or hurt individuals working in 
export manufacturing. 
 
 If we focus only on the labor demand effect, higher wages will lower total income 
when the wage elasticity of employment falls below -1 (that is, the absolute value is 
greater than 1). An empirical estimation of labor demand relationships for the global 
apparel industry – a labor-intensive export sector – produces wage elasticity estimates of 
-0.61 (see Appendix B for the estimation details). Therefore, in the global apparel sector 
higher wages will raise total employment income if output prices do not change. 
However, higher labor costs will likely raise prices. Furthermore, the U.S. import demand 
estimations of Table 2 show that import demand is price elastic. Although higher wages 
might have a positive impact on total employment income at the point of production, 
even in labor-intensive sectors such as apparel, this gain could be countered by a price-
sensitive decline in import demand.22 
 
 The magnitude of this price effect depends on how prices respond to wage 
increases. Even in labor-intensive industries such as footwear and apparel, labor costs do 
not account for an overwhelming share of the retail price of imports (see, for example, 
Pollin, Burns, and Heintz 2001). Therefore, relatively large wage increases can result in 
substantially smaller percent changes in retail prices. Moreover, there is evidence that 
consumers are willing to pay more for goods that they know are produced under decent 
employment conditions (Eliott and Freeman 2000). Certification and labeling schemes 
could give these products a competitive advantage in consumer markets relative to 
                                                                                                                                                 
labor costs, demand will increase by more than 10 percent when the absolute value of the price elasticity of 
demand exceeds one. Adding these two effects together yields positive employment growth.  
22      As one would expect, estimates of demand elasticities for imports coming from a particular country 
tend to be much higher than for aggregate imports, although there is much empirical debate over this issue. 
For example, see Panagariya, Shah, and Mishra (2001). Under these conditions, a country or export sector, 
acting alone, would face much stronger negative price effects than would be the case if all exporting 
countries raised wages simultaneously. This latter situation could result from the adoption of an 
internationally coordinated set of labor standards.  
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otherwise identical goods. Under these conditions, higher prices could actually result in 
an expansion of demand (Conroy 2001) – since very similar products may no longer be 
viewed as close substitutes. In general, whether higher wages will reduce employment 
through import price effects will depend on how sensitive prices are to wages and 
whether better wages are connected to other adjustments, such as product differentiation 
and the creation of niche markets. 
 
5.  Discussion 
 
 When import demand is sufficiently income elastic, the growth of consumer 
markets in the global North contributes to the reduction of inter-country inequalities 
through the creation of new economic opportunities that raise aggregate employment 
income among export workers, all other things equal. In terms of reducing income 
inequalities, a demand-led expansion can be superior to productivity improvements 
which do not raise, and may actually reduce, long-run employment incomes. This is 
likely to be the case when the gains from productivity improvements are captured as 
higher rents, instead of lower prices, elsewhere in the commodity chain. Despite the 
arguments presented to this point, there are serious problems with viewing the demand-
led growth of commodity chains, as they are currently constituted, as a sustainable force 
for egalitarian employment-led development.  
 
 First, wages can be lowered by tapping more vulnerable segments of the labor 
market – workers who have a weaker employment bargaining position due to limited 
access to alternative income sources. For example, global commodity chains have been 
extended into the informal economy and many global production networks have 
incorporated home-based workers (Carr, Chen, and Tate 2000). The expansion of such 
relationships lowers average wages and could reduce employment income even when 
aggregate demand is growing. Under these conditions, income terms of trade will fall as 
output expands unless social protections are extended to these new employment 
relationships.  
 
 The reduction of export sector wages is a highly gendered phenomenon. The 
decline in average job quality that accompanied the growth in women’s labor force 
participation has been termed “global feminization” (Standing 1989). However, it is also 
important to recognize that, since labor markets remain segregated by gender, the growth 
in women’s share of low-wage employment also results from an expansion of jobs 
typically dominated by women (Elson 1996). Such segmentation can undermine 
women’s bargaining power with respect to paid employment. Since women are often 
employed in globally mobile industries, an expansion of employment in these sectors 
may not raise women’s bargaining power relative to men working in less footloose 
sectors (Seguino 2002). These gender dynamics could cause total employment income to 
decline. However, it is important to be cautious in drawing conclusions about the welfare 
implications of a fall in employment income. Access to money income improves 
women’s bargaining position at home, thereby strengthening women’s influence over the 
  25
distribution of household resources – with potentially positive welfare implications for 
themselves and their children (Braunstein 2002, Sen 1990, Roldan 1988, Joekes 1987).23 
 
 Second, a direct link to the fortunes of affluent consumer economies is a curse as 
well as a blessing. When consumer incomes are growing, demand for manufactured 
consumer imports outpaces the growth of income and employment expands in low-wage 
export sectors. However, downturns will produce the opposite effect. Growth and 
incomes will co-vary in economies integrated through global commodity chains. 
Increasingly globalized business cycles produce more serious fluctuations in employment 
and income due to cross-border feedback effects.  
 
 Third, there is the question of macroeconomic sustainability. Imports cannot 
continue to grow faster than income in the advanced economies without eventually 
creating a balance of payments problem due to expanding trade deficits, unless exports 
also grow at a similar rate. If exchanges rates adjust to reduce this gap, then import 
demand will fall due to rising prices. A country, like the U.S., with a strong hegemonic 
currency in international financial markets, could potentially finance an on-going trade 
deficit without an exchange rate correction that would drastically cut imports. Indeed, the 
U.S. has maintained a trade deficit for decades. However, it is unclear by how much trade 
deficits in advanced economies can continue to expand until they become unsustainable. 
 
A fourth concern is that competition among emerging industrial sectors to secure 
greater export market share can lead to overcapacity when growth of production outstrips 
the growth of global demand (Erturk 2002). Such excess capacity will place downward 
pressure on prices and production costs, thereby further limiting the ability of producers 
and workers to capture the value generated along global commodity chains. Slower 
global growth and the inability to sustain increasing import demand in the industrialized 
North exacerbate this dynamic. 
 
 Fifth, environmental sustainability must be taken into consideration when the 
growth of employment income in developing economies is predicated on an increase in 
incomes and consumption in the global North. This is particularly important since the 
expansion of import demand discussed here is a component of the overall growth in 
consumption, not a targeted increase in import demand alone. Annual consumption in the 
world’s advanced economies currently devours a significant quantity of material 
resources. For example, a study of selected advanced economies found that to generate 
$100 of income in Germany, the Netherlands, or the United States requires about 300 
kilograms of natural resources (Adriaanse et al. 1997). This translates into a requirement 
of 75 to 85 metric tons of material resources to support the annual consumption of a 
typical person in these economies. Pursuing development strategies that explicitly link 
higher incomes in poor countries to a continuous expansion of current patterns of 
                                                 
23    This increase in household bargaining power can depend on the size and constancy of income flows. 
For example, Naila Kabeer (2000) demonstrates these complexities in her study comparing the impact of 
participation in remunerative work on household bargaining dynamics for women in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
who worked in factory jobs, relative to female Bangladeshi immigrants in London, who often were 
employed in home-working situations. 
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consumption in high-income nations will likely have serious environmental consequences 
in the future.  
 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that, although growth in consumer demand 
creates new employment opportunities, these are low-wage jobs. In many cases, 
production takes place in the informal economy, in unregulated factories, or in home-
based work with few, if any, social protections. Indeed, access to paid employment is 
frequently insufficient to raise a household above a basic dollar-a-day poverty threshold 
(Majid 2001). As mentioned earlier, a low-productivity, low-wage trap is possible in 
which the proliferation of poverty-level jobs is only desirable because of the 
wretchedness of the next-best options. 
 
 These cautionary observations are not meant as a call to dismantle demand-driven 
commodity chains, but rather as an argument for transforming the way they operate and 
the way market power is distributed. The growth potential of global production networks 
is strong and need not be limited to low-wage employment creation through the 
expansion of derived demand. Furthermore, transforming global production and 
distribution systems can support on-going development objectives in ways that a low-
productivity, low-wage equilibrium growth path cannot. 
 
 In this discussion, I will briefly look at four redistributive strategies for 
transforming the current structure of buyer-driven commodity chains that do not 
necessarily depend on the growth of income and consumption in affluent consumer 
markets. These are: (1) asymmetric trade liberalization in the global North; (2) industrial 
up-grading; (3) the implementation of codes of conduct and global labor standards; and 
(4) fostering the development of domestic markets and South-South commodity chains. 
 
 Asymmetric trade liberalization in the global North. This policy intervention has 
received a great deal of attention in recent years, often focusing on on-going trade 
negotiations, such as the dismantling of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), debates 
over agricultural subsidies, and agreements on non-agricultural market access (NAMA). 
Traditional trade barriers, non-tariff barriers, and production subsidies in the world’s 
advanced economies all restrict access to high-income consumer markets. Often, labor-
intensive goods are relatively more highly protected than capital-intensive goods 
(UNCTAD 2002). Removing these barriers to trade redistributes income to poorer 
countries, creating new employment opportunities. Such reforms produce one-shot 
redistributions, but the growth in income could have long-run dynamic effects. 
Nevertheless, this strategy does not address the deeper structural problems identified by 
the unequal exchange tradition. Therefore, such trade reforms need not be symmetric. 
That is, developing economies could retain certain protections that form part of a larger 
industrial policy. As per capita incomes rise, the extent of these protections would be 
reduced. 
 
 Industrial up-grading. Industrial up-grading refers to the movement up global 
commodity chains in order to capture a larger share of the income and rents generated 
through the process of production and distribution (Gereffi 1999, Kaplinsky 1998). In 
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particular, if producers in the lower echelons of global commodity chains are able to 
share in the various types of rents generated at other points, this provides the resources 
needed to raise average incomes and to move towards creating more decent employment 
opportunities (Kaplinksy 1998).24 The success of the four original “Asian tigers” 
(Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore) is often cited as an example of the 
potential of industrial up-grading.25 These economies moved from assembling goods for 
Western consumer markets to producing higher value-added exports and, in some cases, 
creating their own brand identities.  
 
 However, there are problems with assuming that industrial up-grading will be an 
automatic outcome of the growth of global production networks. In the case of the “Asian 
tigers”, industrial up-grading was accompanied by the out-sourcing of assembly and basic 
manufacturing functions to lower wage countries in Asia and Central America.26 In these 
cases, industrial up-grading represented a displacement, rather than a transformation, of 
low-wage, low-productivity production. In addition, current competitive pressures might 
constrain the capacity for up-grading of the new generation of low-wage exporters by 
limiting the resources and the flexibility needed for pursuing long-run strategies of 
industrial development. Furthermore, as more and more countries compete on the global 
export market, the opportunities for additional export penetration could be curtailed 
(Erturk 2002). The four original Asian tigers were able to successfully up-graded their 
industries because of their industrial policies and the existence of extensive government-
industry linkages; these strategies might not be available to all countries. Such a situation 
creates the possibility of a two-tiered growth path for developing economies, in which the 
poorest and most underdeveloped face continued marginalization.  
 
  Codes of conduct and global labor standards. The enforcement of international 
labor standards by certifying compliance with a code of conduct also has potential for 
raising employment incomes at the level of production. However, care must be taken 
with implementation. Since subcontractors face intense competition, pushing these firms 
to raise wages and labor standards and absorb the higher costs is likely to produce 
unintended consequences, such as job losses. Nevertheless, brand-name manufacturers 
and large retailers possess the market power needed to implement improvements in labor 
standards at the level of production by compensating subcontractors for the cost 
                                                 
24    In the apparel industry, industrial up-grading often consists of moving from “cut, make, and trim” 
(CMT) operations, in which the cloth is supplied by the contracting firm, to “full-package” (FOB) 
exporting, in which the subcontractor is entirely responsible for manufacturing ready-to-wear clothing. 
With full-package exporting, the brand-name company effectively withdraws from the production process. 
When subcontractors provide these additional services, they can claim a larger share of the income 
generated throughout a commodity chain. 
25    The industrial development of East Asian economies has sometimes been described as following a 
“wild-geese-flying” pattern, a term coined by Kaname Akamatsu (1962). According to this theory, 
international linkages allow less-developed economies to up-grade their industries by following the 
economic development of more advanced economies as they proceed through various stages of 
development. 
26   The exact extent to which such outsourcing was caused by a search for low-wage production to support 
industrial up-grading is difficult to ascertain since this geographical dispersion also involved “quota-
hopping” – that is, moving production to new countries in order to avoid the quota restrictions imposed by 
the Multi-Fiber Arrangement. 
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increases. For example, they could raise retail prices modestly and pass these revenues 
back to finance the improvements in employment conditions. As previously mentioned, 
studies have found that consumers are willing to pay a price premium for products 
produced under decent working conditions. Therefore, unintended job losses would be 
avoided since subcontractors who complied with the standards would receive the 
resources necessary to implement the improvements without reducing the final demand 
for the products. 
 
 The creation, implementation, and enforcement of codes of conduct are 
components of another strategy for redistributing rents across global commodity chains. 
Because of the rents associated with branding, retailers and brand-name manufacturers 
are sensitive to reputation effects that might damage a carefully crafted corporate image. 
A bad image can be disastrous for profits and can cripple a company’s ability to secure 
future branding rents. This vulnerability can be leveraged in order to redistribute 
resources across the commodity chain to subcontracted workers.  In many respects, the 
implementation of a code of conduct represents a variation on the more general strategy 
of changing the distribution of rents across commodity chains. However, unlike industrial 
upgrading and similar innovations, codes of conduct target the large multinationals that 
possess most of the market power within a commodity chain.  
 
Domestic markets and South-South commodity chains. The limitations of a purely 
export-oriented employment strategy to improve relative living standards raise a more 
profound question – are there alternative approaches to employment-led development that 
would be appropriate as part of a more comprehensive set of economic policies? The 
disjuncture between domestic markets and domestic production in the current pattern of 
globalization makes the logic of an export-oriented strategy seem compelling. However, 
a different possibility would be to pursue policies that reconnect production with 
domestic needs and demands. Such a program would differ from strict stabilization 
packages aimed at achieving external balances. For example, the strategy would need to 
regulate financial flows and capital mobility in order to create space for more 
autonomous state interventions in industrial policy and development. Furthermore, 
instead of arbitrary fiscal deficit targets, it could emphasize public investments in 
infrastructure. The policies would not have to be insular or protectionist. Instead, the 
emphasis would be on pursuing interventionist strategies to regulate global markets and 
meet domestic objectives. 
 
Along these same lines, an emphasis on the expansion of South-South trade, 
pursued with domestic development strategies, could help close the gap between rich and 
poor nations by limiting the dependence of manufacturing exports from low-income 
countries on the expansion of affluent consumer markets. Instead, the expansion of 
consumption in developing nations would support the expansion of South-South trade 
with rents remaining in developing countries. The fact that economic linkages are forged 
between developing countries does not preclude an unequal distribution of opportunities 
or a race to the bottom. Indeed, South-South competition can often be fiercer than North-
South competition. However, an emphasis on a cooperative approach to developing 
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domestic markets along with expanding export capacity would limit the possibility of 
destructive outcomes arising from intense competition. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and future research  
 
This paper has argued that the expansion of manufacturing exports from 
developing economies contributes to a more equal distribution of income when demand 
for consumer imports responds vigorously to the growth of high-income consumer 
markets. The expansion of employment opportunities associated with growth in 
manufacturing production is the key factor behind rising employment incomes in 
developing countries. However, convergent growth conditioned on ever-increasing export 
consumption will likely prove to be unsustainable in the long-run due to macroeconomic 
constraints, environmental stress, or high levels of demand volatility. Furthermore, the 
competitive logic of globalized production can erode income gains when producers tap 
into more vulnerable segments of the labor market by employing workers with weaker 
bargaining positions. 
 
The backdrop to this analysis has been the structure of global commodity chains. 
These institutional features impact the distribution of the net economic gains associated 
with an expansion of globalized manufacturing. Although the institutional environment 
has changed, the factors identified by theorists in the unequal exchange tradition remain 
relevant to understanding the power dynamics of today’s production networks: market 
power is concentrated among firms in the advanced economies, sourcing decisions are 
characterized by a high capacity for international substitution from one producer to the 
next (creating a similar environment as would a high degree of capital mobility), 
producers in low-wage export sectors face extremely competitive conditions, and labor 
markets in developing countries are characterized by the existence of surplus labor.  
 
 This paper has explored a few of the distributive issues associated with low-wage 
manufacturing in developing countries. However, many questions remain. The model of 
global commodity chains could be adapted and more fully exploited to examine how 
changes in institutional relationships affect distributive outcomes. There is a need to 
disaggregate the empirical work presented here and to look more closely at sectoral and 
regional differences. In this same spirit, more country-specific studies would complement 
other research in shedding light on distributive issues, including employment, wage, and 
income relationships in export-oriented industries. Similarly, empirically-grounded 
microeconomic studies of the distributive dynamics of global commodity chains and how 
they differ across industries would test the validity of many of the assumptions adopted in 
the theoretical models developed here.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
A.1. First and second order conditions. 
 
A firm chooses b to maximize total rents as given by the following objective function, 
presented as Equation 3 in the main text:  
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The first order condition is: 
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The second order condition, which will be labeled S, is given by: 
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The first two terms in the above expression are negative, given a downward sloping 
demand curve, decreasing marginal rents due to branding, and the first order condition. 
Likewise, the final term is negative if the marginal costs of branding are increasing. If we 
make a further assumption that δPP ≤ 0, then the second order condition always holds. 
Note this assumption is consistent with a range of demand functions – including linear 
forms. 
 
 
A.2. Marginal benefit and cost curves. 
 
From the first order condition, we can derive an expression for the net marginal benefits 
of branding: 
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and the indirect marginal costs: 
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Clearly B′  is a decreasing function of b, assuming decreasing marginal returns and 
increasing, or constant, marginal costs to branding: 
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The shape of the marginal cost curve is more complex. Assuming the second order 
conditions hold as described above, marginal costs will be a convex function of b with a 
positive slope over the relevant range for maximization: 
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A.3. Comparative statics 
 
The first-order condition can be solved for b and the optimum, b*, expressed as a function 
of the parameters in the price equation: 
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How does b* respond to an exogenous change in these parameters? Substituting b* into 
the first order condition and differentiating with respect to the relevant parameter yields 
the following comparative static results, if the assumptions involving the second-order 
conditions still hold: 
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How would prices respond to an exogenous change in one of these parameters? Taking 
the example of labor productivity: 
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Using the comparative static results above, the first term is positive while the second term 
is negative. We would generally expect productivity improvements to reduce prices. 
However, a special case, in which prices increase with higher labor productivity, is 
possible. This would tend to happen when demand is price inelastic, marginal rents 
associated with branding are high, and the optimal level of branding is very responsive to 
reductions in production costs.   
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Appendix B 
 
 In order to estimate income and price elasticities of import demand, all variables 
are expressed as natural logs. Augmented-Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for unit 
roots reveal that all of the variables are non-stationary. However, first-differences of the 
variables are stationary. This raises the possibility that a cointegrating relationship exists 
in which a linear combination of the variables is stationary. Therefore, the import demand 
relationship is estimated using an error-corrections model: 
 
 (10) tttm
ttt
m
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in which Mt represents real imports, Ptm represents relative import prices, and Yt 
represents real income in time ‘t’. When variables are preceded by the operator ‘d’ it 
indicates the variables are expressed in first-differences. 
 
 An error-correction model is useful in that it allows us to model long-run 
equilibrium relationships between variables expressed as levels and short-run fluctuations 
around the equilibrium using differenced variables. The long-run equilibrium relationship 
(the error correction term) is contained in parentheses following the parameter β3 in the 
above model, in which β3 is expected to be negative. The intuition behind the model is 
straight-forward. If imports, M, lie above the equilibrium relationship with prices, P, and 
income, Y, the error correction term would have a net positive value and the change in M 
in the subsequent period would be negative. If M lies below the equilibrium level, just the 
opposite would occur. When the system is in equilibrium there would be no impetus for 
import demand to change. 
 
 Table B1 contains the results of the estimates. Model 1a is an OLS estimation of 
the long-run relationship in levels, using an autoregressive distributed lag structure. If a 
cointegrating relationship exists, then the residuals of the equation, calculated using the 
estimated long-run coefficients, should be stationary, even though the variables expressed 
in levels are non-stationary.27 Both augmented-Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for 
unit roots show that these residuals are indeed stationary. Model 1b estimates the 
corresponding error-correction model, including the lagged residuals as the error-
correction term. Note that all variables included in this estimation are stationary. In the 
error-correction model, the coefficients on the income and relative price variables are 
significant and have the correct sign. Furthermore, the coefficient on the error-correction 
term has the expected negative sign – suggesting a stable equilibrium relationship exists. 
 
 Model 2 repeats the same estimation as Model 1, except that lagged terms with 
insignificant coefficients are dropped. Again, augmented-Dickey Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests show that the residuals of the long-run model are stationary. In both the long-
run OLS and the error-correction models, the coefficients on the income and relative 
                                                 
27    That is, a linear combination of the variables, using a vector of the long-run coefficients in the model, 
must be non-stationary for this specific cointegrating relationship to exist. 
  37
price variables are significant and have the expected sign. The coefficients on the 
variables in the error-correction model represent the short-run demand elasticities with 
respect to income and price – that is, an income elasticity of 0.63 and a price elasticity of 
-0.61. Long-run demand elasticities can be derived from the equilibrium solution of 
Model 2a. That is, the estimated coefficients on the variables expressed in levels are 
divided by one minus the coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable, since Importst 
must equal Importst-1 in equilibrium. For example, the long-run income elasticity is 
0.3749 divided by 0.1422, or 2.64. Both short-run and long-run elasticities are presented 
in Table 2 in the main text. 
 
Table B1 
Estimates of U.S. import demand elasticities, error-correction model with  
cointegrated variables, 1982:2 to 2002:1, t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
 Long-run 
(OLS) 
Error 
correction 
Long-run 
(OLS) 
Error 
correction 
Importst-1 
0.9547 
(7.60)  
0.8578 
(15.55)  
Importst-2 
-0.0812 
(-0.69)    
Rel. import pricet 
-0.5273 
(-1.76) 
-0.6110 
(-2.21) 
-0.4158 
(-3.92) 
-0.6110 
(-2.21) 
Rel. import pricet-1 
0.1635 
(0.49)    
Real disposable incomet 
0.5680 
(1.65) 
0.6461 
(2.18) 
0.3749 
(2.25) 
0.6289 
(2.12) 
Real disposable incomet-1 
-0.2290 
(-0.69)    
Error correctiont-1  
-0.1298 
(-3.46)  
-0.1245 
(-3.48) 
Constant -0.5579 (-1.63) 
0.0010 
(0.18) 
-0.6062 
(-2.04) 
0.0002 
(0.04) 
R2 0.996 0.187 0.997 0.188 
Durbin-Watson 1.99 1.87 1.74 1.88 
N 78 79 79 79 
 Data sources are described beginning on page 21 of the main text. 
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Appendix C 
 
 In order to gauge to what extent changes in output and real wages impact 
employment in the global apparel industry, a panel data set covering 49 countries over 
the years 1981 to 1996 was assembled using data from the 2001 3-digit ISIC Industrial 
Statistics Database of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
and the World Development Indicators 2001 CD-ROM from the World Bank.  This 
dataset included annual measurements of employment, real wages, and real output for the 
apparel industries in the countries for which complete data were available. All variables 
were expressed in natural logarithms. Using the general method of moments (GMM) 
technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for the estimation of dynamic panels, 
the following model was estimated in which employment (Ei,t) is expressed as a function 
of real wages (wi,t) , real output (yi,t) , and country-specific effects (νi): 
 
  Ei,t = α + δEi,t-1 + βxwi,t-x + γxyi,t-x + νi + µi,t, for x = 0 …1 
 
Lags of one and two years were included for the wage and output variables. The GMM 
estimation for dynamic panels involves expressing the equation in first-differences. Since 
wages and output cannot be taken as strictly exogenous, lagged values for these variables, 
expressed in levels, were used as instruments in the estimation. 
 
Table C1. GMM estimates of dynamic labor demand equations for the 
apparel industries of 49 countries, 1981-96, n=686, t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Variable Lag (1) One-step (2) Two-step 
Employment Ei,t-1 
 
0.6060 
(14.24) 
 
0.6073 
(29.41) 
Real wages wi,t 
 
-0.3789 
(-7.51) 
 
-0.3779 
(-21.01) 
 wi,t-1 
 
0.1266 
(2.59) 
 
0.1379 
(16.52) 
Real output yi,t 
 
0.4854 
(12.55) 
 
0.4924 
(51.09) 
 yi,t-1 
 
-0.1466 
(-3.23) 
 
-0.1543 
(-11.93) 
Constant 
 
-0.0038 
(-3.42) 
 
-0.0034 
(-9.79) 
Wald χ-squared (all coefficients) 
 
1774.56 
 
27684.79 
Sargan autocorrelation test -8.79 
(p-value<0.001) 
-2.81 
(p-value=0.0049) 
 
 The results are presented in Table C1. Note that both one-step and two-step GMM 
estimations are presented. While the two-step procedure can achieve some efficiency 
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gains, standard errors may be underestimated. Therefore, the one-step results can be more 
reliable for drawing inferences about the coefficient estimates.  
 
 Wald tests show that the sum of the coefficients on the wage variables and the 
output variables are statistically significant and have the expected signs – that is, 
increases in real wages have a negative impact on employment while increases in real 
output have a positive impact. For the one-step GMM estimators, the Wald test of the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients were not statistically different from zero yielded a 
test statistic for the real wage variables of  χ2(2)=75.51 (p-value<0.001) and a test 
statistic for the real output variables of χ2(3)=180.53 (p-value<0.001). The Wald test of 
the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients were equal to zero yielded a test 
statistics of χ2(1)=48.96 for real wages and χ2(1)=74.05 for real output. In interpreting 
the results, it is helpful to summarize the estimates in a more user-friendly fashion. For 
example, from these results, we can develop long-run estimates of the impact of changes 
in real wages and output on employment. These calculations, based on the two-step 
GMM procedure, are presented in Table C2. Because all variables were expressed in 
logarithm form, these coefficients can be interpreted as elasticity estimates. 
 
 The long-run coefficient on real wages is -0.611. This means that a 10% increase 
in real wages would be associated with a 6.1% decrease in employment, other factors 
remaining constant. Likewise, a 10% increase in output is associated with a 8.6% 
increase in employment. Therefore, holding other factors constant, including unobserved 
country-specific effects, an increase in real wages does appear to have a negative impact 
on employment in the apparel sector. However, the response is inelastic – that is, the 
decrease in employment is of a lesser magnitude than the increase in real wages.  
 
 
Table C2. Elasticity of labor demand estimates, 
long run estimates based on the results in Table 1 
Variable Long-run coefficient estimate 
Real wages -0.611 
Real output 0.861 
 
 
 
